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February 2017

Do Savings Increase in Response to Salient Information about Retirement and Expected Pensions?

By Mathias Dolls, Philipp Doerrenberg, Andreas Peichl and Holger Stichnoth How can retirement savings be increased? We explore a unique policy change in the context of the German pension system to study this question. As of 2004, the German pension authority started to send out annual letters providing detailed and comprehensible information about the pension system and individual expected pension payments. This reform did not change the level of pensions, but only manipulated the knowledge about and salience of expected...

Saving and taxation in a voluntary pension system : toward an agent-based model

By Balázs Király Mandatory pension systems only partially replace old-age income, therefore the government also operates a voluntary pension system, where savings are matched by government grants. Accounting for the resulting tax expenditure, our models describe the income flow from shortsighted to farsighted workers. 1. In rational models, explicit results are obtained, showing the limited learning of shortsighted workers. 2. In agent-based models, this learning is improved and this raises the shortsighted workers' saving and reduces perverse income redistribution. (more…)