February 2017

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

By Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A M Ponzetto Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promised compensation. If pension packages are "shrouded," so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highly back-loaded. In...

Pension Risk and Risk Based Supervision in Defined Contribution Pension Funds

By Rodolph Heinz and Randle Tony The main goal of any pension system is to ensure that members receive an adequate pension income when they retire. Whilst traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans set out what that pension income will be in advance and then strive to deliver it, the growing number of defined contribution (DC) plans accumulates a sum of assets which can then be turned into a pension income on retirement. However, the amount of this retirement income...

Constitutional Reform and Universal Pension Law

By Noemí Monroy Enriquez En México, en los próximos años, la tendencia demográfica se caracterizará por el incremento de la población adulta de 65 años o más, la cual, en su mayoría, no cuenta con algún ingreso para su subsistencia. El fenómeno del incremento de la población de edad avanzada no solamente es nacional; de acuerdo con el informe de Naciones Unidas, el crecimiento de la población adulta de 60 años y más se ha acelerado, lo que genera todo...

Saving and taxation in a voluntary pension system : toward an agent-based model

By Balázs Király Mandatory pension systems only partially replace old-age income, therefore the government also operates a voluntary pension system, where savings are matched by government grants. Accounting for the resulting tax expenditure, our models describe the income flow from shortsighted to farsighted workers. 1. In rational models, explicit results are obtained, showing the limited learning of shortsighted workers. 2. In agent-based models, this learning is improved and this raises the shortsighted workers' saving and reduces perverse income redistribution. (more…)