Customize Consent Preferences

We use cookies to help you navigate efficiently and perform certain functions. You will find detailed information about all cookies under each consent category below.

The cookies that are categorized as "Necessary" are stored on your browser as they are essential for enabling the basic functionalities of the site. ... 

Always Active

Necessary cookies are required to enable the basic features of this site, such as providing secure log-in or adjusting your consent preferences. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable data.

No cookies to display.

Functional cookies help perform certain functionalities like sharing the content of the website on social media platforms, collecting feedback, and other third-party features.

No cookies to display.

Analytical cookies are used to understand how visitors interact with the website. These cookies help provide information on metrics such as the number of visitors, bounce rate, traffic source, etc.

No cookies to display.

Performance cookies are used to understand and analyze the key performance indexes of the website which helps in delivering a better user experience for the visitors.

No cookies to display.

Advertisement cookies are used to provide visitors with customized advertisements based on the pages you visited previously and to analyze the effectiveness of the ad campaigns.

No cookies to display.

Sustainable Pensions, Democratic Governance, and EU Law

By Ewan McGaughey

The quality of democracy in our economy depends on the governance of capital, but Europeans are still deprived of real voice over their retirement money: the single biggest source of capital in the 21st century. This paper outlines three major problems facing EU pensions: precarious retirement, escalating inequality, and mounting climate damage. These problems start with the places where we work, the institutions that control our retirement savings, and the votes on shares that come with them. The central argument is that pensions will only be sustainable once they are democratically, prudently and loyally governed. First, member states have wide experience with co-determination in capital funds, which can inform the basis of minimum standards in EU law for ‘pension fund democracy’. Second, a growing number of investment rules draw upon member states’ fiduciary duties, and standards for prudence or care, but these do not yet codify the requirement that beneficiaries’ environmental, social and governance preferences are followed. Third, votes on shares, bought with pension fund assets, are still being cast by banks and asset managers who manage ‘other people’s money’. This is a serious problem because banks and asset managers have interests that systematically conflict with the ultimate investors: they vote in companies on other people’s money, and at the same time sell financial products, like pensions, to those companies. The problems are soluble with careful amendments to existing policy, to ensure elected representatives of pension beneficiaries are the sole determinants of voting policies, with prudence, and no conflicts of interest. A draft EU Directive, based upon emerging best practice, is proposed.

Source: SSRN

460 views