Customize Consent Preferences

We use cookies to help you navigate efficiently and perform certain functions. You will find detailed information about all cookies under each consent category below.

The cookies that are categorized as "Necessary" are stored on your browser as they are essential for enabling the basic functionalities of the site. ... 

Always Active

Necessary cookies are required to enable the basic features of this site, such as providing secure log-in or adjusting your consent preferences. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable data.

No cookies to display.

Functional cookies help perform certain functionalities like sharing the content of the website on social media platforms, collecting feedback, and other third-party features.

No cookies to display.

Analytical cookies are used to understand how visitors interact with the website. These cookies help provide information on metrics such as the number of visitors, bounce rate, traffic source, etc.

No cookies to display.

Performance cookies are used to understand and analyze the key performance indexes of the website which helps in delivering a better user experience for the visitors.

No cookies to display.

Advertisement cookies are used to provide visitors with customized advertisements based on the pages you visited previously and to analyze the effectiveness of the ad campaigns.

No cookies to display.

Politics Before Pensions: How New ESG Rules Expose Public Pension System Vulnerabilities

By Danilo Risteski

As some of the largest institutional investors in the United States, public pension funds wield considerable power over investment decisions. A recent trend highlights this extraordinary power: state pension funds have started exploiting their retirees’ pensions to force investment companies to invest in accordance with their respective states’ political priorities. Nowhere is this trend more obvious than in the environmental, social, and governance field. On one hand, states like Maine have passed legislation prohibiting public pension funds from investing in fossil fuels companies. On the other hand, states like Texas have passed laws prohibiting state entities from doing business with companies that oppose the fossil fuel and gun manufacturing industries. Investment companies operating across state lines are therefore caught between a rock and a hard place: continue investing in fossil fuels and risk antagonizing liberal states like Maine or divest from fossil fuels and lose business from conservative states like Texas. Pension funds can exploit public retirees’ funds for political ends because of a subtle fiduciary orientation surrounding public pension funds. Whereas private pension funds are governed by uniform federal laws that center fiduciary duties around pension plan participants and beneficiaries, public pension funds are governed by a patchwork of state laws that center fiduciary duties around the funds themselves. Thus, states are free to tailor their own pension fund investment rules as they see fit, sometimes at the expense of retirees. The result is an assortment of fifty different legal systems, piled on top of the recent trend toward politicizing investment decisions. Often, as the cases of Texas and Maine show, investment companies will find themselves unable to simultaneously comply with the various public pension fund requirements from state to state. Moreover, because state treasurers exercise almost unbridled discretion over investment allocations, they can all but freely abuse pensions funds in pursuit of political ends. With trillions of dollars under management, retirees stand to lose the most. This Note argues that public pension investment laws need urgent reform and standardization to prevent sacrificing retirees’ financial security in service of political priorities. To do so, state legislatures should pass laws modeled after the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which governs private pension plans. Such standardization will ease the burden of compliance for investment companies and investment advisers while simultaneously forcing pension fund managers to prioritize retirees’ pecuniary gains.

Source University of Colorado Law Review